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I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, some legal historians examining the European
conquest and acquisition of the Americas have argued that
European states claimed the right to seize the lands of the
indigenous populations and to govern the inhabitants on the
grounds that by not being Christians, such people did not have the
same right to possess property and self-govern that Christians
enjoyed. These historians called this the Doctrine of Discovery,
according to which:
“[W]hen [a] European, Christian nation first discovered new lands the
discovering country automatically gained sovereign and property
rights in the lands of the non-Christian, non-European nation even
though, obviously, the natives already owned, occupied, and used
these lands.”1

* James Muldoon, Professor of History (Emeritus) at Rutgers University is
an Invited Research Scholar at the John Carter Brown Library, and the author
of several books including Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels and Empire and Order:
The Concept of Empire, 800-1800 as well as articles on canon law and European
expansion.
1. ROBERT J. MILLER ET AL., DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: THE
DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES 3 (2010) (quoting Robert J.
Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1,
5 (2005) [hereinafter The Doctrine of Discovery]); Robert J. Miller, Lisa Le Sage,
& Sebastián López Escarcena, The International Law of Discovery, Indigenous
Peoples, and Chile, 89 NEB. L. REV. 819, 820-83 (2010); Robert J. Miller, Brazil,
Indigenous Peoples, and the International Law of Discovery, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 1 (2011) [hereinafter International Law of Discovery]; ROBERT A. WILLIAMS,
JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF
CONQUEST (1990); ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES
OF EMPIRE IN SPAIN, BRITAIN AND FRANCE C.1500–C.1800 46-47 (1995); JILL
NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES 56-57 (2004). Alexander VI did not, however,
make such a claim. James Muldoon, Papal Responsibility for the Infidel:
Another Look at Alexander VI’s Inter caetera, 64 CATH. HIST. REV. 168, 168-84
(1978), reprinted in JAMES MULDOON, CANON LAW, THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE,
AND WORLD ORDER IV (1998).
1
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Under the principle of Discovery, “non-Christian peoples did not
possess the same human and natural law rights to land,
sovereignty, and self-determination as Christian peoples.”2
According to those who have advanced the theory, this claim
originated in claims that medieval popes had advanced for a
thousand years, as far back as the fifth century AD. The papal goal
was to create a “‘universal Christian commonwealth[,]’” a goal that
led to the crusades and the creation of the theory of the holy war in
order to achieve its fulfillment.3 The fullest statement of this
program came in 1493 in Pope Alexander VI’s three bulls, known
collectively as Inter caetera, which according to these historians,
“granted European monarchs ownership rights in newly discovered
lands” as well as other economic and governmental rights and
privileges.4
The final stage of the development of the Doctrine of Discovery
came in three U.S. Supreme Court decisions that Chief Justice John
Marshall issued in the 1820s and 1830s regarding the legal status
of the Cherokee Indians in Georgia.5 According to its proponents,
when Marshall issued his famous decision in 1823, Johnson v.
M’Intosh, concerning the status of the Cherokee Indians in Georgia,
the long-established Doctrine of Discovery became the legal basis
for European, and later American, possession of the lands occupied
by the indigenous peoples of the United States; this doctrine was
subsequently employed in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.6
Two other of his decisions in related cases, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia decided in 1831, and Worcester v. Georgia decided in 1832,
completed the application of the Doctrine of Discovery in American
law.
In recent years, interest in the Doctrine of Discovery has led to
calls on the current pope to revoke or annul Inter caetera and similar
papal documents as part of a process of reconciliation between the
Catholic Church and the indigenous peoples of the United States.
These calls, often by religious leaders, assume that the Doctrine of
Discovery is an accurate statement of the legal basis employed to
justify the European conquest of the Americas.7 It also assumes that

2. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1.
3. The Doctrine of Discovery, supra note 1, at 8 (quoting WILLIAMS, JR., supra
note 1, at 29).
4. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 12.
5. The term Indians that Marshall employed is no longer employed. The
term Native Americans is used.
6. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-65; see also Blake A. Watson, The
Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery on Native Land Rights in
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 507, 507-51
(2011)(discussing the application of this doctrine in other Anglophone
countries).
7. See LAURENCE BEHRENS & LEONARD J. ROSEN, WRITING AND READING
ACROSS THE CURRICULUM 280 (5th ed. 1994) (citing Resolution of the National
Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 278-82 (May 18, 1990). The various
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Marshall employed this doctrine in Johnson v. M’Intosh and is,
therefore, the basis for American law with regard to the indigenous
peoples of the United States to this day.8

II. STADIAL THEORY
But did Marshall base Johnson v. M’Intosh on the Doctrine of
Discovery and the theory that, because they were non-Christians,
the Indians did not have the same rights as Christians? While
Marshall did refer to discovery as a fundamental element of the
developing legal regime that accompanied the conquest of the
Americas,9 he did not discuss the religious status of the indigenous
inhabitants of the United States at any length in Johnson v.
M’Intosh or in either of the other related cases. He never claimed
that non-Christians had no right to possess land and self-govern
simply because they were not Christians.
A careful reading of Marshall’s decisions in the cases involving
the Cherokees in Georgia demonstrates that he saw the indigenous
population not in terms of their religious status, but in terms of
their cultural and social level of development; that is in terms of the
stadial or four-stage theory of development that emerged in the
eighteenth century, especially among Scottish thinkers such as
Adam Smith.10 In Smith’s Wealth of Nations and, in more detail, in
his Lectures on Jurisprudence, he outlined what he saw as the
stages through which human societies passed throughout the course
of social development.11 Each stage involved the occupation and
development of property. This was not a universal and inevitable
course of development; however, and Smith was not an economic
determinist.12 Such stages of development depended on “suitable
positions on this issue are conveniently presented in this volume. On the moral
and religious issues, see James Axtell, Moral Reflections on the Columbian
Legacy, THE HISTORY TEACHER 407-25 (1992).
8. See generally Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587 (1823) (stating “[t]he
United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule by
which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They hold, and assert in
themselves, the title by which it was acquired. They maintain, as all others have
maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title
of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right to such a
degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would allow them to
exercise.”).
9. Id. at 574-84 (describing “[t]he history of America, from its discovery to
present day” in 1823, and how this “proves . . . the universal recognition of these
[discovery] principles”).
10. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE AND
ARMS 107 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896) (stating “[t]he four stages of society
are hunting, pasturage, farming, and commerce”).
11. PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 29-46 (1980)
(first citing ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); then citing SMITH,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (1763)).
12. SEE ANTHONY BREWER, ADAM SMITH’S STAGES OF HISTORY 2 (DEP’T
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conditions”, physical and social, for its success.13 As one modern
scholar has observed: Smith “seems to have seen the success of
Europe not as inevitable but as a remarkably lucky special case[,]”
that is, a region in which all the necessary conditions for full
development existed.14
The numerous European voyages of exploration that began
with Columbus sparked interest in the varieties of human social
development that the explorers had encountered.15 How did these
other societies develop and why were there so many varieties of
society? Were there “certain universal legal principles which were
binding on all men, irrespective of the time and place in which they
lived”; that is, the natural law, and a universal course of
development that could be “regarded as the basis of an international
law” and relations?16 Or, did human societies evolve over time in a
variety of ways, and with their own sets of laws, as groups of people
developed ways of life shaped by the unique circumstances in which
they lived? One response to these questions was the stadial theory
that outlined a course of human development, from primitive to
fully civilized existence. The first proponent of what was to become
the four-stage, that is the stadial, theory of development, was Sir
John Dalrymple (1726-1810). He presented it in his book on the
feudal law of property where the “stages of society appear as an
introduction to the history of the alienation of property in land[.]”17
Societies passed from being composed of “hunters and fishers” to the
“discovery of pasturage” and the herding of animals, to the creation
of “new arts of life and particularly the art of agriculture” and
ultimately to “the alienation of property in land[.]”18 He also
“mentions the importance of commerce” but, as a modern author
pointed out, “he does not identify” commerce as “a specific ‘state’”
[or stage of development] as later writers such as Adam Smith were
to do.19
It is worth noting at this point that European writers were
using the Iroquois of North America as an example of huntergatherer societies. A Jesuit missionary, Joseph-François Lafitau
(1681-1746), had pointed out “the similarity of certain Indian
customs to those he had read about in classical writings[,]”
ECON., UNIV. BRISTOL Discussion Paper No. 08/601, 2008), pdfs. sema
nticscholar.org/a317/9eac8db97b67c88800aa792a5881c96f03f6.pdf (discussing
the conflicting opinions over whether Smith was an economic determinist). This
article takes the position that Smith was not an economic determinist.
13. ANTHONY BREWER, ADAM SMITH’S STAGES OF HISTORY at 20.
14. Id. at 21.
15 See MARGARET T. HODGEN, EARLY ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE SIXTEENTH
AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 8-9 (1964).
16. STEIN, supra note 11, at 3.
17. Id. at 24 (citing John Dalrymple, AN ESSAY TOWARDS A GENERAL
HISTORY OF FEUDAL PROPERTY IN GREAT BRITAIN, 76-77 (1757)).
18. Id. (citing Dalrymple, supra note 17, at 76-77).
19. Id. at 25 (citing Dalrymple, supra note 17).
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suggesting that the ancient Greeks had evolved from the primitive
state of existence.20 Lafitau’s work suggested that the Iroquois and
other indigenous peoples of North America could develop as the
Greeks had done.21
Adam Smith produced the fullest version of the stadial theory
of development, building on the work of a number of earlier
scholars, legal thinkers such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and
Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), philosophical authors such as Baron
Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746),
historians such as David Hume (1711-1776), and missionaries such
as Lafitau. “All these influences blended to produce the
philosophical history of legal institutions” that many scholars had
sought.22 The key issue in all of these discussions of social
development was how land was possessed and controlled. What
interested Smith was the conclusion that “changes in control of land
and changes in form of government” provided a “neat cyclical
pattern which it gave to the major periods of European history.”23
The course of development involved in such changes was not,
however, “entirely inevitable” because the “citizens of a state could
themselves determine their future, provided that they had the
will.”24 This would explain why some societies did not develop to a
more advanced state of existence.
In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith “made frequent use of
the stages of society — hunters, shepherd nations, and so forth”, but
“it was in his Lectures on Jurisprudence that his full exposition of
the four-stage theory, again with increasingly developed property
law as society progresses, was recorded. In his telling, increased
regulation of property becomes necessary as competition over
resources increases[.]”25 In the Lectures, Smith summed up his
theory thus:
There are four distinct states which mankind pass thro [sic]: -- 1st,
the Age of Hunters; 2dly, the Age of Shepherds; 3dly, the Age of
Agriculture; and 4thly, the Age of Commerce. It is easy to see that in
these severall [sic] ages of society, the laws and regulations with
regard to property must be very different[.]26

20. Id. at 17.
21. See id. at 17-18 (explaining that when Joseph-François Lafitau
compared Iroquois and Greek customs in his novel, Moeurs des Sauvages
Amériquains Comparées aux Moeurs des Prémiers Temps (1724), he “revealed
to the world the simple truth that also the Greeks had once been savages”);
PROFESSOR A.D. MOMIGLIANO, STUDIES IN HISTORIOGRAPHY 141 (1966).
22. STEIN, supra note 11, at 30.
23. Id. at 32.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. David B. Schorr, The Tragedy of the Commons at 50: Context, Precedents,
and Afterlife: Savagery, Civilization, and Property: Theories of Societal
Evolution and Commons Theory, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES. L. 507, 512 (2018)
(citing ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 27, 32-35 (R.L. Meek et al.
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Stadial theory described the development of human societies
from the hunter-gatherer level to the commercial and trading level
that Europeans had attained. Each level of development that an
individual society attained had an impact on neighboring societies
that had not developed. For example, pastoralists drive their herds
over lands occupied by hunter-gatherers; pastoralists in turn find
their ranges limited by fence-building, land-owning farmers; finally,
agriculturalists create commercial cities.27 In other words, the more
advanced peoples, as defined by the theory, come to dominate the
less advanced who either assimilated, moved on, or died out. One
scholar summed up Smith’s theory this way:
The four stages theory served Smith in two different ways. First, it
had a static, or comparative, function in accounting for the form of
law and government in different societies. Thus, hunters live in small
groups with little need for a concept of property, pastoral peoples need
a concept of property in herds of animals but not necessarily in land,
and so on. In a lecture course on jurisprudence, that is, on the forms
of law and government, this clearly bulks large, but it is not, as it
stands, a theory of history. It becomes a theory of history when the
stages are placed in order, with a claim that each stage, given suitable
conditions, evolves into or is replaced by the next.28

III. JOHNSON V. M’INTOSH
A central question in Johnson v. M’Intosh was the relation
between people who existed at different levels of development.29 The
specific issue was whether or not an individual or private
corporation could purchase land from the Piankeshaw Indians and
have the title to the land recognized by American courts.30 Did the
Indians own the land they occupied and could they, therefore, sell
or otherwise alienate it to anyone they wished? In this decision,
Marshall examined the history of the land involved and concluded
that when Englishmen arrived in North America, the land “was
held, occupied, and possessed, in full sovereignty by various
independent tribes or nations of Indians, who were the sovereigns
of their respective portions of the territory, and the absolute owners
and proprietors of the soil[,]” a point that he repeated throughout
his judicial career.31
Having recognized the sovereignty of the Indians, Marshall
then began to qualify his statement. From “time immemorial, and
always up to the present time, all the Indian tribes, or nations of
eds., 1982)).
27. Brewer, supra note 12, at 2-4.
28. Id. at 20.
29. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 543.
30. Id. at 571.
31. Id. at 545. However, it is unclear what Marshall meant by sovereignty.
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North America . . . held their respective lands and territories each
in common” and there was “no separate property in the soil[.]”32 This
meant that for “certain chiefs of the tribe[,] selling . . . represent[ed]
the whole tribe in every part of the transaction[,]” that is the sale of
the land, and then dividing the “money or commodities” received
among the individuals of the tribe.33
The question that Johnson v. M’Intosh was designed to answer,
therefore, was not whether the Indians owned the land but could
they alienate it, to whom, and under what circumstances. The
plaintiffs, Johnson and Graham’s lessee, claimed the land based on
purchase directly from the Indians while the defendant, William
M’Intosh, claimed a title based on purchase from the United States
government that “had purchased the same land of the same
Indians” at some earlier point.34
From Marshall’s position, it would seem, therefore, to be
unnecessary, and merely speculative, to discuss the question
respecting the sort of title or ownership, which may be thought to
belong to savage tribes, in the lands on which they live.”35 Their
“title by occupancy is to be respected, as much as that of an
individual, obtained by the same right, in a civilized state.”36 In
addition, he added that the circumstance “that the members of the
society held in common, did not affect the strength of their title by
occupancy.”37 Therefore, the Indians had the right to sell their
lands. Consequently, the “only question in this case must be,
whether it be competent to individuals to make such purchases, or
whether that be the exclusive prerogative of government.”38 A
related issue was who represented the community in the sale of
communal lands, and were they the legitimate representatives of
the community.39
In stadial theory, collective ownership of land is a lower level
of development than individual ownership.40 Furthermore,
Marshall’s reference to the Indians as “savage tribes” and to their
right of occupancy as less than the full right of possession, but equal
to the similar right that an individual “in a civilized state”

32. Id. at 549.
33. Id. at 549-50.
34. Id. at 562.
35. Id. at 562-63.
36. Id. at 563.
37. Id.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 562-63. Sir William Blackstone defined occupancy as “the taking
possession of those things, which before belonged to nobody.” This occurred
when land was “common to all mankind” and not possessed by individuals. If
individuals took “any thing to his own use, and . . . actually took it into
possession[,]” then he “should thereby gain the absolute property of it[.]”
William Blackstone, Book the Second: Of the Rights of Things, in 1
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 258 (1765-69).
40. STEIN, supra note 11, at 36.
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possessed, indicates that he saw them at a level that twentieth
century observers might term underdevelopment.41 Nevertheless,
they possessed a “right of soil” that was recognized in various
European treaties including a “memorial, or manifesto, of the
British government, in 1755[.]”42 The Indians “were not British
subjects, nor in any manner bound by the authority of the British
government[.]”43 Consequently, no “mere act of the executive
government,” including the act of 1755, could divest them of “their
rights of property[.]”44
According to the plaintiffs, the British imperial government
could not deny the rights of the Indians, neither could any of the
other European imperial governments, and neither could their
successor states such as the United States.45 The Indians possessed
their lands and could alienate them to whomever they wished, so
the original colonists could and did purchase land directly from
Indian tribes as the plaintiffs argued. The defendants, however,
argued to the contrary, asserting that:
[T]he uniform understanding and practice of European nations, and
the settled law, as laid down by the tribunals of civilized states,
denied the right of the Indians to be considered as independent
communities, having a permanent property in the soil, capable of
alienation to private individuals.46

According to Marshall, the reason for this was that the Indians
“remain in a state of nature, and have never been admitted into the
general society of nations.”47 Here, he was underscoring the place of
the United States within the civilized, that is European, legal order,
unlike the Indians who did not qualify. Consequently, all “the
treaties and negotiations between the civilized powers of Europe
and of this continent . . . have uniformly disregarded their supposed
right to the territory included within the jurisdictional limits of
those powers[,]” a position the defendants argued rests on “the
hypothesis, that the Indians had no right to soil as sovereign,
independent states. Discovery is the foundation of title, in European
nations, and this overlooks all proprietary rights in the natives.”48
41. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 563.
42. Id. (emphasis added). Marshall pointed specifically to the treaties of
Utrecht (1713) and Aix la Chapelle (1748). Id. This was a reminder that the
entry and then actions of Europeans in the Americas must be understood in the
context of the European military and diplomatic situation within Europe and
along its borders with the expanding Ottoman Empire. Id.
43. Id. at 564.
44. Id. at 563-64.
45. Id. at 563.
46. Id. at 567.
47. Id.
48. Id. Not until the nineteenth century was any non-European state
included in the international regime. B.V.A. Röling, Are Grotius’ Ideas Obsolete
in an Expanded World?, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
291-92 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1992).
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Furthermore, even “if it should be admitted that the Indians were
originally an independent people, they have ceased to be so” because
in the course of time they had “passed under the domination of”
other, that is European, states.49 In effect, the Indians were a
conquered people and subject to the conqueror’s laws.
As if the foregoing arguments were not enough, Marshall then
presented the defendant’s argument that the Indians possessed
their lands and explained the consequences of that argument on this
case. The argument was that while the Indians did originally
possess their lands, they “never had any idea of individual property
in lands.”50 Therefore, those who purchased the Indians’ lands
“could not take the sovereignty and eminent domain to
themselves.”51 The Indians were, according to Marshall, “that class
who are said by jurists not to be citizens, but perpetual inhabitants
with diminutive rights” and they are treated “as an inferior race of
people, without the privileges of citizens, and under the perpetual
protection and pupilage of the government.”52 In terms of “the law
of nature, they had not acquired a fixed property capable of being
transferred.”53 Thus,
[according] to every theory of property, the Indians had no individual
rights to land: nor had they any collectively, or in their national
capacity . . . [because] the lands occupied by each tribe were not used
by them in such a manner as to prevent their being appropriated by
a people of cultivators. All the proprietary rights of civilized nations
on this continent are founded on this principle. The right derived from
discovery and conquest, can rest on no other basis . . . [so that] all
existing titles depend on the fundamental title of the crown by
discovery.”54

Admittedly, in some colonies, New England in particular, “some
lands have been held under Indian deeds. But this was an anomaly
arising from particular local and political causes.”55
Having presented the positions of the two sides in the case,
Marshall gave his decision, opening with a clear statement of what
was at stake. Could land purchased from the “Piankeshaw nations”
be held by a “title [that] can be recognised [sic] in the Courts of the
United States?”56 Did the Indians have the power “to give, and of
private individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in the
Courts of this country[?]”57
Marshall observed that every society has the right “to prescribe

49. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 568.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 569.
53. Id. at 570.
54. Id. at 569-70.
55. Id. at 571.
56. Id. at 571-72.
57. Id. at 572.
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those rules by which property may be acquired and preserved is not,
and cannot, be drawn into question[.]”58 There is therefore no need
to examine “those principles of abstract justice . . . which are
admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the rights of civilized
nations . . . but [only] those principles also which our own
government has adopted in the particular case, and given us as the
rule for our decision.”59
Marshall then turned to the situation in the New World when
Europeans first arrived. He asserted that “the great nations of
Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as
they could respectively acquire.”60 They justified their territorial
claims on the “character and religion of its inhabitants” because
these “afforded an apology for considering them as a people over
whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy.”61
Europeans justified their claims by “convincing themselves that
they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new, by
bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange for
unlimited independence.”62 To regulate relations among the
competing European empires, their rulers agreed, “that discovery
gave title to the government” whose subjects first entered a region
and therefore “the sole right of acquiring soil from the natives.”63
Each European nation was, therefore, responsible for relations
between colonists and the indigenous population in the lands they
acquired.64
In Marshall’s opinion, the rights “of the original inhabitants
were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to
a considerable extent, impaired.”65 He stated that:
[The Indians were] the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it . . . but their rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.66

According to Marshall, all of the states of Europe agreed with these
principles, and they were expressed in the treaties dealing with the
Americas that they signed among themselves in the centuries
following Columbus’s first voyage.67 In effect, he saw the European
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 572-73.
62. Id. at 573. In fact, the initial charters did not involve a search for land
to colonize. Id. They were designed to find a route to the Asian spice markets.
Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 574.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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acquisition of land in the Americas not in terms associated with
papal theories but in terms of Hugo Grotius’s conception of
international law. That is, the law is found in the treaties,
conventions, traditions, and customs of the European states.68
Although some of the language and concepts employed in these
documents had roots in various papal documents, they were
understood and employed within the Grotian framework and not as
the popes and canon lawyers had understood and employed them.69
The newly created United States, deriving its jurisdiction over
the Indians from the British government from which it had
separated, thereby “unequivocally acceded to that great and broad
rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country.”70 That
is, the United States dealt with the Indian population on the same
basis as the European states operated: “that discovery gave an
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by
purchase or by conquest[.]”71 In asserting the American claim to
acquisition by the long-established principle of discovery, Marshall
was again making an important point: the United States
participated in the civilized world legal order as an equal of the old
European states, unlike the Indian nations. In fact, although
Marshall is most famous for his decisions in constitutional cases,
“he authored more than twice as many decisions on international
law as he did on constitutional law.”72
Having justified the claims of the United States government to
jurisdiction over the lands of the Indians by using the discovery
claims that European states had developed earlier, Marshall was
able to avoid any lengthy discussion about “whether agriculturists,
merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles,
to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to contract their
limits.”73 “Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror
cannot deny . . . [regardless of] the original justice of the claim which
has been successfully asserted.”74
Conquest, in turn, however, created a new situation: what
would be the relation between the conquerors and the conquered?
As a general rule, Marshall argued, the conquered “are incorporated
with the victorious nation, and become subjects or citizens of the
government with which they are connected[,]” eventually forming

68. Hedley Bull, The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International
Relations, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 75-77 (Hedley
Bull et al. eds., 1992).
69. James Muldoon, Colonial Charters: Possessory or Regulatory?, 36 L. &
HIST. REV. 355, 357-64 (2018).
70. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587.
71. Id.
72. JOEL RICHARD PAUL, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN
MARSHALL AND HIS TIMES 262 (2018).
73. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588.
74. Id.
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“one people[,]” blending conquerors and conquered.75 An obvious
historical example was the creation of the English people out of the
Saxons and the Normans as a result of William the Conqueror’s
victory at Hastings in 1066.
If such blending was not possible, however, what would be the
result? According to Marshall, the original inhabitants of the
United States were “the tribes of Indians . . . [who] were fierce
savages . . . whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.”76
To allow them to retain possession of the lands they occupied “was
to leave the country a wilderness[;]” but, “to govern them as a
distinct people, was impossible, because . . . they were ready to repel
by arms every attempt on their independence.”77 The United States
faced the dilemma of how to deal with “a people with whom it was
impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as a distinct
society[.]”78 Furthermore, as “the white population advanced, that
of the Indians necessarily receded.”79 In time, the “game fled into
thicker and more unbroken forests, and the Indians followed.”80 The
soil “being no longer occupied by its ancient inhabitants” was
divided among the subjects of the European ruler who claimed the
region by discovery, because the “law which regulates, and ought to
regulate in general, the relations between the conqueror and the
conquered, was incapable of application to a people under such
circumstances.”81 The American situation required “some new and
different rule[,]” one that would be “better adapted” to the American
situation.82
Marshall went on to argue that it was a recognized principle
that if adventurers acting “under the authority of an existing
government” discovered a vacant land and took possession of it, the
government that authorized their venture has the right to dispose
of the discovered land in the same way as it can “dispose of the
national domains” in the mother country.83 As far as the English
were concerned, “no distinction was taken between vacant lands
and lands occupied by the Indians” because the Indians had only a
“right of occupancy[,]” not to absolute possession.84 The situation of
the Indians under the British was “peculiar” because “in some

75. Id. at 589.
76. Id. at 590.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 590-91.
81. Id. at 591.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 595.
84. Id. at 596; On the issue of what constituted vacant land (terra nullius):
see Andrew Fitzmaurice, The Genealogy of Terra Nullius, in AUSTRALIAN
HISTORICAL STUDIES 1-15 (2007); Bruce Buchan & Mary Heath, Savagery and
Civilization: From Terra Nullius to the ‘Tide of History’, 6 ETHNICITIES 5-26
(2006).
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respects, [they acted] as a dependent, and in some respects as a
distinct people . . . too powerful and brave not to be dreaded as
formidable enemies[.]”85
The description of the Indians and their way of life in Johnson
v. M’Intosh presents a complex picture of Indian-White relations.
On the one hand, the Indians were capable of asserting some rights
in the land they occupied, especially the right to alienate it under
some circumstances.86 This right was restricted, however, by the
claim of European governments to limit the purchase of specific
Indian lands to the subjects of those rulers whose adventurers had
first discovered the lands.87 Indian lands could also be acquired by
conquest.88 Presumably, the anticipated result would be the gradual
blending of the conquered and the conquering peoples into a single
nation. This had been the historical experience of Europeans:
German barbarians occupied the Roman world and created the
various peoples of Europe; the Normans and the conquered Saxons
became the English.89 Why would that that not happen in the
Americas? The answer was that it would not happen because the
Indians were too fierce and savage to accept the domination of the
White population readily.90 Furthermore, the Indians were huntergatherers, a population inevitably destined to yield as the
agriculturalists advanced.

IV. CHEROKEE NATION V. GEORGIA
Johnson v. M’Intosh was a stage in the development of
Marshall’s position of the status of the Cherokees and, by extension,
Indians throughout the United States. A few years later, he issued
two more decisions involving the state of Georgia and its Indian
population that further developed his picture of the Cherokees and
their way of life. In 1831, the Cherokees brought a case, Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, that asked the court:
[T]o restrain the State of Georgia from the execution of certain laws
of that State which, as is alleged, go directly to annihilate the
Cherokees as a political society, and to seize, for the use of Georgia,

85. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 596.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. MARJORIE CHIBNALL, THE DEBATE ON THE NORMAN CONQUEST 92-93
(Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1999).
90. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 590 (stating “the tribes of Indians inhabiting
this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose
subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of
their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct
people, was impossible, because they were as brave and as high spirited as they
were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their
independence”).
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the lands of the Nation which have been assured to them by the
United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in force.91

The case itself focused on two issues: the relation of the state
of Georgia to the federal government and the question of the status
of the Cherokees. Did they form a “foreign state in the sense in
which that term is used in the Constitution?”92 Article I of the
Constitution assigned to Congress the authority to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian Tribes.”93 The decision would determine whether or
not the Cherokees could seek redress in the federal courts as a
foreign state could.94 If they could not seek the protection for their
society and its rights from the federal courts, what would prevent
Georgia from annihilating them “as a political society”95 and as a
people?
At the beginning of the decision, Marshall exhibited some
compassion for the plight of the Cherokees. He described them as:
A people once numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found by
our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample
domain, gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and
our arms[.]96

The gradual decline of these people occurred in spite of the
numerous treaties that guaranteed their possession of the lands
that they occupied.97 By now, “they retain no more of their formerly
extensive territory than is deemed necessary to their comfortable
subsistence” and this remnant is what they sought to protect from
the state of Georgia.98 The remnant would be the amount of
farmland required to maintain an agricultural population.99
Marshall’s description of the Cherokee’s plight has a tone of
romantic melancholy. The Cherokees now live within the narrow,
shabby ruins of their once powerful society.100 The acts of the federal
government “plainly recognize the Cherokee Nation as a state, and
the courts are bound by those acts.”101 In fact, although the Indians
formed a state, it was not a foreign state in constitutional terms.
The Indian tribes may “be denominated domestic dependent
nations[,]” and their inhabitants “are in a state of pupilage” with
regard to the United States, a status similar to that “of a ward to

91. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15 (1831).
92. Id. at 16.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
94. U.S. CONST. art. III.
95. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 5-6.
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id.
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his guardian.”102 The result is that the Cherokee Nation cannot
obtain protection from the Court on the grounds that they alleged
because it was not a foreign state in constitutional terms.103
The portrait of the Cherokees that Marshall painted in this
decision modified, to some degree, a position he had taken in
Johnson v. M’Intosh. In the earlier decision, he declared that he
would not consider the argument that agriculturists have the right
to occupy the lands over which pastoralists travelled in the course
of the year because agriculture is a higher and more productive use
of the land.104 That is, he avoided the stadial theory in his discussion
of the Cherokees at that point. In the next case, however, without
explicitly saying so, he saw the situation of the Indians in stadial
terms. The Indians, once powerful and independent, were now
“gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our
arms” and they “have yielded their lands by successive treaties” to
the United States.105 They have retained only the amount of land
“deemed necessary for their comfortable subsistence.”106 In other
words, the Indians must themselves become farmers in order to
survive alongside the Americans who were seizing their hunting
grounds and sowing them. The Indians faced three futures:
acculturation, exile, or, as stated in the opening of the decision,
annihilation as a people.107 Development along stadial lines is a
natural process and those who fail to accept it will be gone.

V. WORCESTER V. GEORGIA
The final decision in Marshall’s trilogy of decisions involving
the Cherokees and the State of Georgia was Worcester v. Georgia,
the longest of the three decisions and the most forceful presentation
of the federal government’s position on relations with the Indian
tribes. It also provided the fullest discussion of the future
development of the Cherokees under the guidance of the federal
government. The case involved a Vermonter named Samuel
Worcester, a Protestant missionary, who entered the Cherokee
lands in Georgia in order to preach Christianity.108 State officers
arrested him on the grounds that he had violated a state law that
required Whites to obtain permission from the state before entering
the Cherokee lands.109 Worcester pleaded that “under the authority
of the president of the United States” and with the permission and
approval of the Cherokee Nation he was “engaged in preaching the
102. Id. at 17.
103. Id. at 52.
104. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588.
105. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
109. Id. at 529-31.

16

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:Article1stPg

gospel[.]”110 He was doing this “in accordance with the humane
policy of the government of the United States for the civilization and
improvement of the Indians[.]”111
The Georgia Court rejected the missionary’s claim that he was
properly authorized to preach to the Cherokees, however, and
sentenced him to four years hard labor in prison.112 The case was
appealed to Supreme Court on the grounds that the Georgia law
authorizing the missionary’s conviction was “repugnant to the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.”113 In effect,
the indictment and subsequent conviction of the missionary
questioned “the validity of the treaties made by the United States
with the Cherokee Indians” that authorized the missionary’s
activities.114 In doing this, Georgia had “exercised the powers of
government over a people who deny its jurisdiction, and are under
the protection of the United States.” 115 The Georgians, therefore,
had no right to require “all white persons, residing within the limits
of the Cherokee Nation” to obtain “a license or permit from his
excellency the governor” or other authorized officer of the state.116
In order to explain why the state of Georgia had no right to
prevent the missionary, or any other “white persons[,]”117 from
entering the Cherokee lands, as the Georgia law effectively did,
Marshall turned to the history of European expansion into the
Americas. When the Europeans first arrived, America “was
inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations,
independent of each other and of the rest of the world, having
institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own
laws.”118 To the argument that discovery enabled Europeans to
“claim dominion” over “the inhabitants of either quarter of the
globe[,]” Marshall responded it was difficult to comprehend that
discovery “should give the discoverer rights in the country
discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient
possessors.”119 He pointed out, again, that “‘discovery gave title to
the government by whose subjects or by whose authority it was
made, against all other European governments, which title might
be consummated by possession.’”120 The result was that “the nation
making the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, [gained] the
sole right of acquiring the soil and of making settlements on it.”121
110. Id. at 538.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 532.
113. Id. at 536.
114. Id. at 541.
115. Id. at 536.
116. Id. at 542.
117. Id. at 520.
118. Id. at 542-43.
119. Id. at 543.
120. Id. at 543-44 (quoting Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573).
121. Id. at 544.
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This in turn “shut out the right of competition among those who had
agreed to it” and “regulated the right given by discovery” in order to
reduce, if not eliminate, potential imperial conflicts.122 This in no
way affected “the rights of those already in possession” because it
gave not possession of the discovered lands to Europeans, but “the
exclusive right to purchase” the lands of the “aboriginal occupants,”
and did not deny “the right of the possessor to sell.”123
The right of the English government to regulate the acquisition
of the Indians’ lands by Europeans in specific parts of North
America by purchase, as a consequence of discovery, had passed to
the United States government as a result of the American
Revolution. These rights and claims had been first articulated in
royal “charters to companies of his subjects” who were to implement
the royal policy of “planting colonies in America . . . and of enriching
themselves.”124 What did the charters provide? According to
Marshall, the charters
purport, generally, to convey the soil, from the Atlantic to the South
Sea. This soil was occupied by numerous and warlike nations, equally
willing and able to defend their possessions. [That being the case, t]he
extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements made on the
sea coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired
legitimate power by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands
from sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any man.125

That is, the charters did not provide a claim to possess the lands of
the indigenous population, only “the exclusive right of purchasing
such lands as the natives were willing to sell.”126 The English did
not “interfere with the internal affairs of the Indians, farther than
to keep out the agents of foreign powers, who, as traders or
otherwise, might seduce them into foreign alliances.”127 The English
purchased lands “but never coerced a surrender of them . . . [and]
purchased their alliance and dependence by subsidies . . . [but]
never interfered with their self government, so far as respected
themselves only.”128 This kind of dependent relationship continued
after the American Revolution with the United States, as the Treaty
of Hopewell (1785) with the Cherokees demonstrated.129 “[F]or the
benefit and comfort of the Indians . . . the United States, in congress
assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the
trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs, as they think
122. Id.
123. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 544. Marshall wrote a history of the English
colonization as the first volume of his 5-volume life of George Washington. JOHN
MARSHALL, A HISTORY OF THE COLONIES PLANTED BY THE ENGLISH ON THE
CONTINENT OF NORTH AMERICA (1824).
124. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 544.
125. Id. at 544-45.
126. Id. at 545.
127. Id. at 547.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 551.
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proper.”130 Marshall admitted, however, that the treaty had “a few
terms capable of being used in a sense which could not have been
intended at the time” and could be misconstrued to the detriment of
the Indians.131 Nevertheless, the “essential articles treat the
Cherokees as a nation capable of maintaining the relations of peace
and war” and of other actions indicating their independent status.132
At the same time, however, “the Cherokee Nation is under the
protection of the United States of America, and of no other sovereign
whatsoever.”133
Clearly, according to Marshall, the United States succeeded to
the powers and jurisdictions claimed by the British government and
the individual states did not. Consequently, the state of Georgia had
no right to prevent anyone from entering the Cherokee Nation to
trade with the inhabitants or, as in this case, to preach the
Christian Gospel to them. In his initial plea, Samuel Worcester had
argued that he had “entered the aforesaid Cherokee Nation in the
capacity of a duly authorised [sic] missionary of the American Board
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, under the authority of the
President of the United States[.]”134 His activities, including
“translating the sacred Scriptures into their language” were
performed with the “permission and approval of the said Cherokee
Nation, and in accordance with the humane policy of the
Government of the United States for the civilization and
improvement of the Indians[.]”135
Marshall then went on to describe the society that Europeans
encountered when they arrived in North America. The enterprising
European adventurers, “guided by nautical science[,]” found a land
“in possession of a people who had made small progress in
agriculture or manufactures, and whose general employment was
war, hunting, and fishing.”136 Did the European adventurers:
[B]y sailing along the coast, and occasionally landing on it, acquire
for the several governments to whom they belonged, or by whom they
were commissioned, a rightful property in the soil . . . or rightful
dominion over the numerous people who occupied it? Or has nature,
or the great Creator of all things, conferred these rights over hunters
and fishermen, on agriculturists and manufacturers?137

As Marshall had observed earlier, theoretical questions about levels
of development and the rights of mankind were not useful in
examining the European occupation of America.138 In other words,
130. Id. at 553.
131. Id. at 554.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 555
134. Id. at 538.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 543.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 544.
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he would not discuss the stadial theory that described how more
advanced societies acquired the lands of less developed societies.
What did matter was the fact that “power, war, conquest, give
rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the world” as the
bases for the acquisition of land.139 So, as he wrote: “We proceed,
then, to the actual state of things, having glanced at their origins;
because holding it in our recollection might shed some light on
existing pretensions.”140
What struck Marshall as important in discussing the European
acquisition of land in America was the problem of the size of
America. It “was too immense for any one of the[] [European states]
to grasp the whole, and the claimants were too powerful” to allow
“any single potentate” to claim it so to “avoid bloody conflicts [over
the possession of land] which might terminate disastrously to all.”141
The European colonizing nations had to establish “some principle”
to resolve differences “between themselves” peacefully.142 The
principle upon which these states decided was that “discovery gave
title to the government by whose subjects or by whose authority, it
was made against all other European governments, which title
might be consummate by possession.”143 This principle was
“acknowledged by all Europeans” because recognizing the
discovering nation having “the sole right of acquiring the soil and of
making settlements on it” prevented competition and armed conflict
among European states in America.144 In making this point,
Marshall made clear that this principle authorized only an
“exclusive right to purchase” land from its Indian possessors if they
wished to sell, but it in no way denied that the Indians owned the
land they occupied.145 In fact, these motives for planting the new
colony “are incompatible with the lofty ideas of granting the soil,
and all its inhabitants from sea to sea. They demonstrate the truth,
that these grants asserted a title against Europeans only, and were
considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were
concerned.”146 The charters demonstrate that one goal of the
colonization process was to ensure “the civilization of the Indians,
and their conversion to Christianity – objects to be accomplished by
conciliatory conduct and good example; not by extermination.”147
According to Marshall, the “power of making war [was]
conferred by these charters on the colonies, but defensive war alone
seems to have been contemplated.”148 The colonists were not
139. Id. at 543.
140. Id.
141. Id. (alteration in original).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 543-44.
145. Id. at 544.
146. Id. at 546.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 545 (emphasis in original).
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authorized to engage in wars of conquest against the Indians, only
wars of defense, if attacked. The history of the early colonies
demonstrated that they “have been frequently ravaged by Indian
enemies,” by “neighbouring savages,” and “laid waste by fire and
sword” in spite of their peaceful intentions.149 The colonists, after
all, were anxious to civilize, Christianize, and trade with the
Indians – not fight them.150
However, in spite of the attempts to regulate the entry of
Europeans into America in order to avoid conflict, the claims of the
competing European nations “unavoidably interfered with each
other; though the discovery of one was admitted by all to exclude
the claim any other,” but “the extent of that discovery was the
subject of unceasing contest.”151 These conflicts, in turn, involved
the Indians, as all the European parties competed “for their
friendship and their aid” in the imperial conflicts rather than
“rousing their resentments, by asserting claims to their lands or to
dominion over their persons . . . .” What the European governments
did not do was to “interfere with the internal affairs of the Indians
farther than to keep out the agents of foreign powers . . . .”152
There was, however, in Marshall’s decision, a suggestion that
the Indians would have to yield before the advancement of the
White population. He pointed to a speech given by the
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Mr. Stuart, at Mobile in 1763, to
the Indians, after the close of the wars with France.153 Stuart stated
that “all individuals are prohibited from purchasing any of your
lands;” so that Indian ownership was recognized by the English
government.154 On the other hand, however, he stated that “your
white brethren cannot feed you when you visit them unless you give
them ground to plant” so “it is expected that you will cede lands to
the King for that purpose.”155 When such agreements are entered
into there shall be “a public meeting of your nation,” so that “the
consent of all your people” is obtained to the transaction.156
Stuart’s speech neatly summed up the situation of the Indians
with regard to the British and the American governments. The
Indians’ right to the lands they occupied was recognized, although
such land was owned collectively by the tribe and not its individual
members. The Indians could therefore alienate any or all of the
land. Due to the discovery doctrine, such alienation could be made
only to the European state whose subjects first entered the land.157

149. Id. at 546.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 546-47.
153. Id. at 547-48.
154. Id. at 547.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 547-48.
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The European government could then sell the land to its subjects
and provide legal title, which would be recognized in its courts.158
The boundaries of the Indian tribal lands would be respected in
light of any alienation of land and “the boundaries of [their] hunting
grounds will be accurately fixed, and no settlement permitted to be
made upon them.”159
Buried within this speech defending the rights of the Indians
was a hint at the future course of events; one not favorable to the
Indians. Implicit in Stuart’s presentation was the theme of stadial
development. The agricultural White population would be
expanding at the expense of the Indians’ hunting grounds. The
“fixed boundaries” promised in the speech would guarantee only the
amount of land required for a settled population.160 The Indians
would be expected to cede land to the expanding White
population.161 Furthermore, White individuals could not purchase
Indians lands, only the discovering government could do that and
then in turn sell the land to individuals.162 Obviously, as the White
population increased, there would be increasing pressure on the
government to acquire more Indian lands for settlement, thus
reducing the land reserved for hunting even further. The Indians
would have to assimilate, move on, or die out.
After the Revolution, the United States took over the
responsibility for Indian relations that the British government had
formerly assumed, including the likelihood of stadial development
affecting the Indians and their way of life.163 At this point, Marshall
raised the question of whether the Indians fully understood the
language of the treaties that they made with the United States.164
After all, presumably, they could neither read nor write and
“certainly were not critical judges of our language” so that they
might not have appreciated the terms to which they had agreed.165
This did not, however, invalidate any agreements with Indians.166
The policy of the United States government with regard to the
Indians was, according to Marshall, two-fold. In the first place,
“[C]ongress has passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with
the Indians; which treat them as nations” that are recognized “as
distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within
which their authority is exclusive” and “guarantied [sic] by the
United States.”167 On the other hand, Congress also passed an act
designed to provide “against the further decline and final extinction
158. Id. at 544.
159. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 547.
160. Id. at 548.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 547-48.
163. Id. at 552-53.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 552.
166. Id. at 554.
167. Id. at 556-57.
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of the Indian tribes” by “introducing among them the habits and
arts of civilization” and “employ[ing] capable persons, of good moral
character, to instruct them in the mode of agriculture suited to their
situation; and for teaching their children in reading, writing and
arithmetic . . . .”168 These policies contemplate “the preservation of
the Indian nations . . . [by] civilizing and converting them from
hunters into agriculturists,” a process that had already begun and
shown results.169 Under this plan, the Indians would remain as a
people but their traditional way of life would have to go. Marshall
added that “the Cherokees had already made considerable progress
in this improvement,” and this progress “encouraged perseverance
in the laudable exertions still farther to meliorate their
condition.”170
To some extent, the two-fold goals of these federal programs
were at odds. The territorial rights of the Indians were guaranteed
and protected, while the people were to be transformed into
Christian farmers.171 The Indians would lose some of the land they
occupied and lose the characteristic elements of their traditional
way of life. The policies of the United States were designed to move
the Indians along the stadial line of development, through the
natural course of human development.172 The power to do this and
to otherwise regulate White relations with the Indians belonged to
the federal government as the successor to the British Empire,
which had made the same claims.173 The European nations had
always recognized the “Indian nations . . . as distinctly independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights,” and
“as the undisputed possessors of the soil” they occupied.174 The “only
exception” to this principle was “that imposed by irresistible power,
which excluded them from intercourse with any other European
potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular
region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European
potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians.”175
The various treaties with Indian tribes stretching back to the
earliest English colonizing endeavors in America recognized the
independence of the tribes: an independence not lost when the
leaders of tribes, recognizing the need for assistance, associated the
tribe by treaty “with a stronger [state], and taking its protection.”176
Such Indian nations “do not thereby cease to be sovereign and
independent states” as long as they are “left in the administration”

168. Id. at 557.
169. Id. at 556-57.
170. Id. at 557.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 559.
173. Id. at 560-61.
174. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 519.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 520.
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of the internal operation of the state.177 In support of this position,
Marshall quoted the words of the international law writer Emer de
Vattel (1714-1767).178 He wrote that “[t]ributary and feudatory
states” in Europe accept the “protection” of more powerful states
because “[a] weak State in order to provide for its safety . . . without
stripping itself of the right of [self] government, and ceasing to be a
State” needed the support of a powerful ally.179 The “Cherokee
Nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory . .
. in which the laws of Georgia can have no force” so that the
sentencing of Samuel Worcester by the Georgia Court “was
pronounced by that Court under colour of a law which is void, as
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the
United States, and ought, therefore, be reversed and annulled.”180

VI. THE CIVILIZED AND THE UNCIVILIZED
In the cases involving the Cherokees, Marshall had to deal with
three sets of social relationships involving the relation of the
Cherokees to White Europeans and to the American population.
These relationships can be expressed in a hierarchical order. Each
involved balancing a pair of conflicting claims to reach a resolution.
The first pair involved the respective claims of civilized and
uncivilized peoples to the occupation and possession of land.181 The
second involved the right of the Cherokees to possess the lands they
occupied and the claim of European rulers and their American
successors to regulate who could purchase the lands of Indians.182
The final pairing involved the competing claims of a state, Georgia,
and the federal government.183 In each case, a lesser form of social,
economic, or political development yielded to a superior one.184 In
the American cases, the uncivilized hunter-gathers had to give way
to the civilized states that regulated relations between their own
subjects and the Indians; a power that the United States federal
government acquired from the British Empire.185 This was and is
the natural course of human development. The Cherokees would
177. Id.
178. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND
SOVEREIGNS, WITH THREE EARLY ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF
NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY, edited and with an Introduction by Béla
Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008).
179. Id. For a discussion of this relationship in Vattel, Grotius, and
Pufendorf, all writers with whom Marshall was familiar, see Wallwyn P.B.
Shepheard, Suzerainty, 1 J. SOC’Y COMP. LEGIS. 432, 433-36 (Dec. 1899).
180. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561-63.
181. Id. at 582.
182. Id. at 582-83.
183. Id. at 583-84.
184. Id. at 582-83.
185. Id. at 582.
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have to assimilate, move on, or die out. Finally, Marshall asserted
the superior authority of the federal government over the states.

VII. CHANCELLOR KENT
Marshall was not alone in seeing history in stadial terms.
Contemporary legal scholars commenting on the development of
American law supported that position as well. The most important
scholars were James Kent (1763-1847), Chancellor of the New York
State judicial system and the author of Commentaries on American
Law (1826-1830), and Joseph Story (1779-1845), a colleague of
Marshall on the Supreme Court (1811-1845), who published the
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833).186
Both commentators dealt with the fundamental issue facing
Marshall, the basis of legal tenure in land in the United States, and
both discussed Johnson v. M’Intosh. Like Marshall, the
commentators were also anxious to demonstrate that the United
States was, by way of England, a part of the European Christian
legal order that shaped international law and relations, and that
underlay the legitimate tenure of land in the United States. Both
commentaries were reprinted regularly throughout the nineteenth
century. Kent‘s “went through fourteen editions and found its way
onto almost every American lawyer’s bookshelf in the nineteenth
century.”187 The Commentaries of Story,188 “perhaps the most
creative judge of his time,” went through five editions in the
nineteenth century.189
Kent opened his Commentaries with a forceful statement of the
place of the United States in the civilized European Christian legal
order. He wrote:
When the United States ceased to be a part of the British
empire,
and assumed the character of an independent nation, they became
subject to that system of rules which reason, morality, and custom
186. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (John M. Gould ed.,
Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 14th ed. 1896) (1833) [hereinafter “KENT,
COMMENTARIES”]; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
(Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 5th ed. 1891)(1833) [hereinafter “STORY,
COMMENTARIES”]; David W. Raack, To Preserve the Best Fruits: The Legal
Thought of Chancellor James Kent, 33 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 320-66 (1989); John
H. Langbein, Chancelor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 547-94 (1993); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, An Empire of Law: Chancellor Kent
and the Revolution in Books in the Early Republic, 60 ALA. L. REV. 377-424
(2009); Farah Peterson, Interpretation as Statecraft: Chancellor Kent and the
Collaborative Era of Statutory Interpretation, 77 MD. L. REV. 712-73 (2018).
187. Daniel Hulsebosch, Debating the Transformation of American Law:
James Kent, Joseph Story, and the Legacy of the Revolution 5 (N.Y. Univ. School
of Law, Public Law & Legal Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-44,
2008).
188. STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 186.
189. Id.
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had established among the civilized nations of Europe, as their public
law.190

The Congress of the new country “professed obedience to that law”
that “defines the rights and prescribes the duties of nations, in their
intercourse with each other,” that is “the law of nations . . . .”191
Kent did not discuss the origin of this legal system, pointing
out that scholars have offered several opinions on this issue. One
school of thought identified the system with the law of nations while
others saw it “as a mere system of positive institutions, founded
upon consent and usage . . . .”192 He did not choose between these
two positions but, instead, argued that he would not “adopt either
of these theories as exclusively true” because the “most useful and
practical part of the law of nations is, no doubt instituted on positive
law, founded on usage, consent, and agreement” but should not be
separated from “natural jurisprudence” and “right reason” either.193
Furthermore, “the science of public law” should not be separated
from “ethics” nor should it be asserted that “governments are not so
strictly bound by the obligations of truth, justice, and humanity in
relation to other powers as they are in the management of their own
local concerns.”194
According to Kent,
[The]law of nations . . . is equally binding in every age, and upon all
mankind. But the Christian nations of Europe, and their
descendants on this side of the Atlantic, [have] by the
vast
superiority of their attainments in arts, and science, and commerce,
as well as in policy and government truths . . . which Christianity
has communicated, and, above all, by the brighter light, the more
certain truths . . . which Christianity has communicated . . . have
established a law of nations peculiar to themselves.195

These factors have created a community of nations capable of
“forming alliances and treaties with each other” that regulate
international relations.196
To demonstrate the importance of the impact of Christianity
on the development of the rules of international relations, Kent
surveyed the limited experience of the Greeks and the Romans at
creating such rules.197 Kent then turned to the state of relations
among the societies that emerged out of the ruins of the Roman
Empire.198 In those centuries, amidst the collapse of all orderly
society, “the law of nations remained in a rude and most
190. KENT, COMMENTARIES, supra note 186, at I:1.
191. Id.
192. Id. at I:2.
193. Id.
194. Id. at I:2-3.
195. Id. at I:3.
196. Id. at I:3-4.
197. Id. at I:6-7.
198. Id. at I:7-8.

26

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:Article1stPg

uncultivated state, down to the period of the 16th century” when the
situation improved.199
During the Middle Ages, the “alliance of the great powers as
one Christian community” gradually led to “the introduction of a
better and more enlightened sense of right and justice among the
governments of Europe.”200 To a great extent, this improvement was
due to the efforts of the Church to control and to limit violence,
replacing it with “a system of morals, which inculcated peace,
moderation, and justice” that brought the contending powers of
Christian Europe into a kind of “confederacy of the Christian
nations” to regulate their relations.201
The flaw that Kent found in the medieval conception of
international order, one that had serious consequences for the
overseas expansion of Europe, was that it “became a general
principle of belief and action, that it was not only a right, but a duty
to reduce to obedience, for the sake of conversion, every people who
professed a religious faith different from their own” so that “war
upon infidels was, for many ages, a conspicuous part of European
public law” but it was a “gross perversion of the doctrines and spirit
of Christianity . . . .”202
This belief, that it was legal “to invade and subdue Mahometan
and Pagan countries, continued very long to sway the minds of men”
on into the early modern world.203 Kent pointed out, however, that
the revival of Roman law in universities provided a basis for
developing “more correct and liberal views of the rights and duties
of nations.”204 Above all, he pointed to the revival of commerce in
the early modern world as an important element in the creation of
a rational body of law in support of the expanding world of
international trade.205 This law was articulated in treaties,
“conventions, and commercial associations” that Europeans made
among themselves.206 This reflected the Grotian conception of a
world order created by the nations involved and not one directed by
any central authority such as the papacy. 207 It required the “revival
of commerce, and with it a sense of the value of order” to create the
modern international legal order not “papal bulls, and the
excommunication of the church” to do so.208 Kent then praised Hugo
Grotius as “the father of the law of nations” who imparted “light and
security, to the intercourse of nations.”209
199. Id. at I:9.
200. Id. at I:10.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.

204. Id. at I:11.
205. Id.
206. Id. at I:12.
207. Id.
208. Id. at I:14.
209. Id. at I:15.
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In Lecture 50 of the Commentaries, “Of the Law of Real
Property,” Kent turned to the specific issue with which Marshall
had wrestled in Johnson v. M’Intosh. The law of real property, he
wrote, is governed by rules of “a technical and very artificial system”
that although “it has felt the influence of the free and commercial
spirit of modern ages, it is still very much under the control of
principles derived from the feudal policy.”210 The fundamental
principle of this law is “that the king was the original proprietor of
all the land in the kingdom, and the true and only source of title.”211
The United States accepted this principle “and applied it to our
republican governments,” from “local governments, or from the
United States, or from that of the crown, or royal chartered
governments established here prior to the revolution.”212 The
consequence of this legal position is that “Indian title is reduced to
mere occupancy.”213
According to Kent, the basis of the European and American
government’s claims to possess lands in North America and “to
dominion over the Indian tribes” has been largely discussed and
explicitly asserted by American courts.214 In Johnson v. M’Intosh, it
was set forth “as an historical fact, that on the discovery of this
continent by the nations of Europe, the discovery was considered to
have given to the government by whose subjects or authority it was
made . . . the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives against
all other European powers.”215 Each of these European nations
“claimed the right to regulate for itself . . . the relation which was
to subsist between the discoverer and the Indians.”216 In practice,
the relation “necessarily impaired . . . the rights of the original
inhabitants” because “the superior genius of the Europeans,
founded on civilization and Christianity, and . . . their superiority
in the means, and in the art of war” provided a basis for their
“ascendancy” over the Indians.217 The United States acquired this
“ascendancy” from the British Empire after the American
Revolution.218
One justification of the claim that discovery gave Europeans
and Americans “a qualified dominion over the Indian tribes” was
that if the land was left to the Indians, the country would remain “a
wilderness” because their state of “relative condition,” that is their
level of development, “rendered them incapable of sustaining any
other relation with the whites than that of dependence and

210. Id. at III:307.
211. Id. at III:377.
212. Id. at III:378.
213. Id. at III:308.
214. Id. at III:379.
215. Id. at III:379-80.
216. Id. at III:380.
217. Id. at III:309.
218. Id. at III:380.
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pupilage.”219 In his opinion, it was not possible “to govern them as a
distinct people, or to mix with them, and admit them to an
intercommunity of privileges . . . .”220 As a consequence, the only
way to deal with the Indians would be to keep “them separate,
subordinate, and dependent, with a guardian care thrown around
them for their protection.”221 After all, the “weak and helpless
condition in which we found the Indians,” a sharp contrast to “the
immeasurable superiority of their civilized neighbors,” would not
allow for any other solution.222
Kent pointed out that although the principle of discovery was
originally employed to regulate relations among the competing
European empires, the reality of the situation in America, the
underdeveloped state of Indian society, converted “the discovery of
the country into a conquest” and it was “too late” to undo the
situation.223 “The country has been colonized and settled, and is now
held by that title. It is the law of the land, and no court of justice
can permit the right to be disturbed by speculative reasonings on
abstract rights.”224 Nevertheless, the lands of the Indians are “not
to be taken from them, or disturbed, without their free consent, by
fair purchase” or by “a just and necessary war.”225
If, however, one wished to discuss on a broad basis Indian title
to land, “the reasonableness” of the White acquisition of Indian
lands
might be strongly vindicated on broad principles of policy and
justice, drawn from the right of discovery; from the sounder claim of
agricultural settlers over tribes of hunters, and from the loose and
frail, if not absurd title of wandering savages to an immense
continent, evidently designed by Providence to be subdued and
cultivated, and to become the residence of civilized nations.226

At this point, following a brief discussion of contemporary
thought on this issue, Kent contrasted the situation of the
indigenous population in North America with that found in Latin
America. Following the work of Emer de Vattel, he pointed out that
while “the conquest of the half civilized empires of Mexico and Peru
was a palpable usurpation, and an act of atrocious injustice, the
establishment of the French and English colonies in North America
was entirely lawful” because the inhabitants were not even half
civilized.227 From Kent’s position, the European conquest of North

219. KENT, COMMENTARIES, supra note 186, at III:380-81.
220. Id. at III:310.
221. Id.
222. Id. at III:3-4.
223. Id. at III:310.
224. Id. at III:310-11.
225. Id. at III:311-312.
226. Id. at III:312.
227. Id. at III:313; EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS
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America was accomplished “with as little violence and aggression,
on the part of the whites, in a national point of view, as were
compatible with the fact of the entry of a race of civilized men into
the territory of savages,” especially since the invaders had more
powerful weapons and better organization.228 Kent admitted that
“there were, at times, acts of fraud and violence” and other evil acts
committed by the colonists, but these actions do not invalidate the
acquisition of Indian lands.229 Overall, the United States
government has “pursued a steady system of pacific, just, and
paternal policy towards the Indians,” the goals of which included
protecting “the Indians from wars with each other, from their own
propensity to intemperance, from the frauds and injustice of the
whites, and to impart to them some of the essential blessings of
civilization . . . .”230
According to Kent, the result of this history of White-Indian
relations since the sixteenth century is “the melancholy contrast
between the original character of the Indians, when the Europeans
first visited them, and their present condition. We found them a
numerous, enterprising, and proud spirited race; and we now find
them, a feeble and degraded remnant, rapidly hastening to
annihilation.”231 He concluded with the pessimistic observation:
“the Indians of this continent appear to be destined, at no very
distant period of time, to disappear with those vast forests which
once covered the country, and the existence of which seems essential
to their own.”232
Kent’s position on land tenure was in line with Marshall’s,
although his Commentaries, like Marshall’s decisions, show a
certain melancholy sympathy for the decline and eventual
annihilation of the Indian people. Such, however, is the fate of those
who do not advance to the civilized level of existence. Kent assumed
the inevitable end of tribal, hunter-gatherer societies in the steady
advance of the settled agricultural and then commercial
populations.233 He was also quite aware that the original purpose of
the principle of discovery was to regulate relations among the
competing European empires, but the application of this principle
had obvious consequences for the Indians as well.234

AND SOVEREIGNS, WITH THREE EARLY ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF
NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whitmore eds.,

Indianapolis, Liberty Fund 2008) (1797).
228. Id. at III:313.
229. Id.
230. Id. at III:317.
231. Id. at III:399.
232. Id.
233. Id at III:387
234. Id. At III:380-81.
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VIII. JOSEPH STORY
Joseph Story, Marshall’s colleague on the Supreme Court, a
well-known author of legal treatises and a noted novelist,235
supported Marshall’s position in Johnson v. M’Intosh not only on
the Court but in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States. This remained in print for a century and went through
several editions.236 The first volume opened with the “History of the
Colonies,” the first chapter of which went directly to the
fundamental issue in Johnson v. M’Intosh, the “Origin of the Title
to Territory of the Colonies.”237 Story based this chapter on William
Robertson’s History of America and Marshall’s History of the
Colonies Planted by the English on the Continent of North
America.238 He asserted that the voyages of Columbus encouraged
adventurous enterprises, the object of which was to found colonies,
or to search for precious metals or to engage in trade with the people
of the New World. The English moved quickly to engage in these
adventures when Henry VII (1485-1509) commissioned John Cabot
(c.1450-c.1500) to subdue and take possession of any lands
unoccupied by any Christian Power, in the name and for the benefit
of the British Crown.239

This voyage “is the origin of the British title to the territory
composing these United States” and is founded “on the right of
discovery,” a theory which all European nations agreed “was a just
and sufficient foundation on which to rest their respective claims to
the American continent.”240 Although Story argued that discovery
justified taking possession of the lands of non-Christians, he also
recognized that the principle of discovery “was probably adopted by
the European nations as a rule . . . by which to regulate their
respective claims” in order to reduce, if not eliminate conflict among
them overseas.”241
Story recognized, however, “in respect to countries then
inhabited by the natives, it is not easy to perceive how, in point of
justice or humanity, or general conformity to the law of nature, it[s]

235. STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 186.
236. Id.
237. Id. at I:1-39. JOHN MARSHALL. HISTORY OF THE COLONIES PLANTED
BY THE ENGLISH ON THE CONTINENT OF NORTH AMERICA, FROM THEIR
SETTLEMENT, TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THAT WAR WHICH TERMINATED IN
THEIR INDEPENDENCE (1824); WILLIAM ROBERTSON, D.D., THE HISTORY OF
AMERICA (1803).
238. Id. at I:4; R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY:
STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC (1985); GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH
STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1970).
239. STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 186, at I:5.
240. Id. at I:6.
241. Id.
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[seizure of their lands] can be successfully vindicated.”242 The law of
nations, however, could have “no authority over the aborigines of
America whether gathered into civilized communities or scattered
in hunting tribes over the wilderness.”243 He argued that the
indigenous population did have a “right, whatever it was, of
occupation or use, [that] stood upon original principles deducible
from the law of nature, and could not be justly narrowed or
extinguished without their own free consent.”244 The Indians in fact,
however, have lost their lands “by the superior force of conquest, or
transferred by a voluntary cession.”245 Story did not believe,
however, there was any point in discussing “the actual merits of the
titles claimed by the respective parties upon principles of natural
law.”246 Such a discussion would deal with many “nice and delicate
topics” but would be more suitable “for a treatise on natural law”
than with a treatise dealing with “the law of a single nation.” In
other words, Story wanted to focus on the realities of the British
colonization of North America, not the theoretical basis for
colonization. 247
As far as Story was concerned, the European imperial nations
had “little difficulty in reconciling themselves to the adoption of any
principle which gave ample scope to their ambition” and therefore
“employed little reasoning to support it.”248 The basis for their
actions was obvious: the “Indians were a savage race, sunk in the
depths of ignorance and heathenism.”249 Perhaps their “want of
religion and just morals” would lead to their being “extirpated” or
they might be “reclaimed from their errors.”250 In any event, the
Indians “were bound to yield to the superior genius of Europe” and
exchange their “wild and debasing habits for civilization and
Christianity” if they wished to survive.251
At this point, Story introduced the role of the papacy in the
work of conquest, observing that the “Papal authority, too, was
brought in aid of these great designs . . . for the purpose of
overthrowing heathenism, and propagating the Catholic
religion.”252 As evidence of this, he pointed to Alexander VI’s bull
Inter caetera that, so he claimed “granted to the Crown of Castile
the whole of the immense territory” that Columbus had discovered,
or would “be discovered . . . as far as it was not then possessed by

242. Id.(alteration in original).
243. Id.
244. Id. at I:4.
245. Id. at I:5.
246. Id.
247. Id. at I:6-7.
248. Id. at I:7.
249. Id. at I:5.
250. Id.
251. Id. at I:7.
252. Id.
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any Christian prince.”253 In presenting this information as he did,
Story reversed the elements of the theory of discovery as usually
presented. He placed the responsibility for European overseas
expansion on the actions of European monarchs who then used the
papacy to provide a legal rationale for the European conquest of the
Americas.254 In contrast, the Doctrine of Discovery places the
responsibility on the papacy for developing the legal rationale for
the conquest of the Americas and then authorizing secular rulers to
implement it.255 Story’s version placed the conquest of the Americas
in a Grotian framework whereby international law and relations
are the product of the treaties and other legal documents that the
participating produced to regulate their relations with one another
instead of relying on the papacy to regulate such relations.256
Once the act of discovery became the established principle of
access to America, each European government could exclude “all
other persons [than their own subjects] from any right to acquire
the soil by any grant whatsoever from the natives.”257 Furthermore,
it “was deemed a right exclusively to the government in its
sovereign capacity to extinguish the Indian title” to the land and
then to “dispose of it according to its own good pleasure.”258 The
result was to create “a peculiar relation between themselves and the
aboriginal inhabitants” who retained a “right of occupancy, or use
in the soil” but that right “was subordinate to the ultimate dominion
of the discoverer.”259 At this point, Story turned to Johnson v.
M’Intosh for a “summary of the historical confirmations adduced in
support of these principles [of discovery], which is more clear and
exact than has ever been in print.”260 What followed was a series of
chapters dealing with the discovery and settlement of the early
colonies.261

IX. CONCLUSION
John Marshall’s decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh “set the
standard and the baseline principle for how the United States would
deal with American Indians and their lands, rights, and
governments.”262 Almost 200 years later, this case is still “a very
influential and important precedent around the world,” especially
253. Id.
254. Id. at I:8-10 (citing Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574-77).
255. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 9-15.
256. Bull, supra note 68, at 65, 71-75.
257. STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 186, at I:8 (alteration in original).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. (alteration in original).
261. Id. (citing Chief Justice Marshall, pp. 574-589 with some minor
variations in language).
262. The Doctrine of Discovery, supra note 1, at 3-4.
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in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia where it played an
important role “in devising, and developing their laws, policies, and
opinions regarding Indigenous peoples.263 Specifically, this decision
set the standard for determining the legitimacy of title to property
acquired from indigenous peoples throughout much of the Englishspeaking world. The decision and its interpretation reached a wide
audience of students, practicing lawyers, and judges through the
numerous editions of the commentaries of Marshall’s
contemporaries James Kent and Joseph Story.264
Some legal historians have asserted that in Johnson v.
M’Intosh, Marshall and those who followed in his tradition, based
the legitimacy of title to land in the United States and other
Anglophone nations on the Doctrine of Discovery. This Doctrine
asserts that those European rulers whose subjects first reached a
point on the shores of North America could claim possession of the
land and domination of the indigenous population on the grounds
that they were not Christians. 265
These writers traced the origin of the Doctrine of Discovery to
several papal bulls of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and
have pointed to the use of language from these bulls in a variety of
documents associated with the European conquest of the
Americas.266 In fact, however, it is clear that these writers have
misunderstood and misused the papal texts to advance their
argument. Marshall did briefly cite and quote elements of the papal
literature, especially Alexander VI’s Inter Caetera, but he did not
base his position in Johnson v. M’Intosh on the papal teaching or on
the theory that the Indians being non-Christians did not possess the
same rights as Christians. 267 Furthermore, Marshall, Kent, and
Story all agreed that the Indians’ right to the lands they occupied
would be recognized, not discussed and debated. It was a given. This
was quite unlike the Spanish conquest of South America, which
generated an extensive debate about the legitimacy and justice of
the conquest involving theologians, philosophers, and lawyers.268
263. Id. at 4; For an interesting discussion of these issues in the
contemporary legal order, see K. W., What sovereignty means for America’s
Indian tribes, ECONOMIST (July 16, 2018), www.economist.com/the-economistexplains/2018/07/16/what-sovereignty-means-for-americas-indian-tribes.
264. It might be interesting to examine the several editions of these
commentaries to see of the later editions reflect any significant changes in the
views of Kent and Story.
265. For a survey of recent work ,see:Kent McNeil, “The Doctrine of
Discovery Reconsidered: Reflecting on Discovering Indigenous Lands: The
Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies …”, OSGOODE HALL LAW
JOURNAL 53(2016): 699-728.
266. Muldoon, supra note 69, at 355-81 (2018).
267. MILLER ET AL., SUPRA NOTE 5.
268. The fundamental work on this theme is that of LEWIS HANKE, THE
SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA (Dallas, TX,
Southern Methodist University Press, 2002) (1949); for the text of the bull, see
Lewis Hanke, Pope Paul III and the American Indians, 30 HARV. THEOLOGICAL
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The North American lawyers focused on the legal relationship
between Indians and White settlers who had actually settled in the
United States in the early nineteenth century and demonstrated
how White-Indian relations had developed since Columbus’s first
voyage.269
These writers were historical not prescriptive, by describing
the specific situation that brought this case to the Supreme Court,
rather than outlining what should have been or ought to be the
relationship between the two peoples. International law for them
therefore was positive law; the doctrines and principles were
contained in the treaties and conventions that European states had
constructed, and in longstanding customs and traditions to which
they adhered, not in academic treatises.270
The decisions containing Marshall’s opinion rested on two
distinct but related premises. In the first place, he saw the issue in
historical terms; the stadial theory of development that described
how less developed societies gave way before the advance of the
more developed societies.271 In the second place, he wanted to
demonstrate that the United States was a civilized nation and
participated in the European international law regime that
regulated relations among the European Christian states.272
Thus, the legal principles involved in the process of discovery
that had been created by the European imperial nations and were
linked to efforts to regulate relations among the warring nations of
Europe throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were
relevant to the American situation. It was in effect, settled law.
According to Marshall, the Indians had lost their lands because they
had not developed from a primitive hunter-gatherer way of life to a
settled, agricultural existence.273 In making this argument, he was
placing the Indigenous peoples of North America within the stadial
theory of development.
As the more advanced societies expanded, they encountered
the less-developed societies. Needing more land to feed their
growing populations, the advanced societies restricted the space
that hunter-gatherer and pastoral societies required to feed their

REV. 65, 71-72 (1937).
269. Marshall did write about the medieval development of Christian
relations with non-Christian peoples in the first volume of his LIFE OF
WASHINGTON (1803), but this work played no role in Johnson v. M’Intosh.
270. See e.g., Treaty of Paris (1763), Art. II, THE AVALON PROJECT,
avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/paris763.asp (last accessed Apr. 10, 2020).
271. See supra pp. 26-27 (describing how Marshall applied the stadial theory
to Cherokee Nation).
272. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587 (stating the United States accepts and
maintains the discovery principles Europe has maintained over acquiring title
to land).
273. In fact, of course that is exactly what the Cherokees were doing by
admitting missionaries, taking up agriculture and settled life and becoming
Christians.
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smaller populations.274 This process forced the less-developed
societies to adapt to the superior settled way of life, to move on to
more open land, or to die out as a people. In the course of the process
of adaption and assimilation, the Indians would have to give up
most or all of their traditional way of life. The stadial theory
justified this process on the grounds that those who make the most
productive use of land have the right to take it from those who are
less productive when the need for more farmland arises.275 This was
the inevitable course of human history.
The more advanced societies, the civilized peoples with their
superior technology and organizational skills, what these legal
writers call their “genius,” will overpower the less developed
peoples.276 In fact, however, unlike some other Indian tribes where
“resistance to acculturation persisted,” the Cherokees had had
begun the process of “conscious acculturation . . . carried out by the
leadership” so that they would appear to be developing as the
stadial theory dictated.277 In this process, the Indians discovered the
value of the lands they occupied “and refused to surrender them.”278
In the United States, according to Marshall, as a consequence
of the American Revolution, the federal government acquired the
claims of the English government with regard to the New World.
Late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century English kings laid claim
to regulate European access to any lands discovered by their
subjects who possessed royal commissions authorizing the
acquisition of land not already subject to Christian rulers.279 Such
lands were surrendered to the king who then granted them to the
explorers and settlers to be in held in soccage from him.280 The king
also claimed a monopoly of access of Europeans into any specific
lands his subjects discovered.281 Only subjects of the English king
or aliens authorized by him could engage in trade with and purchase
land from the inhabitants of such discovered regions.282 The
legitimacy of title for lands acquired from the Indians rested
therefore in the king, not in individual purchases directly from the
Indians.
Marshall argued that all the European nations engaged in
overseas exploration and colonization accepted the principle that
274. Brewer, supra note 12, at 3-4; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
275. Brewer, supra note 12, at 14-15; Johnson, 21 U.S. at 590-91.
276. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573.
277. NORGREN, supra note 1, at 78.
278. Id.
279. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 576-77.
280. FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES AND
TERRITORIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
COMPILED AND EDITED BY FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE (1909)(referencing the
Charter of Massachusetts Bay in 1629)
281. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 576-77.
282. Id. at 572-73.
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discovery justified a monopoly of access to the land and people so
discovered, and a monopoly of European access to such lands.283 The
purpose was to recognize the legitimacy of the claims of the various
competing imperial states to access to specific lands and then to
have jurisdiction over all Europeans who enter those lands.
Legitimate title to lands acquired from the indigenous population
could only be obtained from the European ruler who had a
recognized monopoly of access to the land.284
The primary purpose of what is labeled the Doctrine of
Discovery was not to justify seizing the lands of the Indians, but to
reduce, if not eliminate, conflicts among the expanding European
imperial powers by recognizing monopolies of access to specific
regions of North America for the purpose of trade.285 In this sense,
the European imperial states and John Marshall were engaging in
the same policy as Alexander VI had acted on when he issued Inter
caetera.
For Marshall, in the American situation, his goal was to end
conflict between the federal government and the states by
attributing to the federal government jurisdiction with regard to the
lands of Indians and therefore the source of title to lands acquired
from Indians. Marshall’s decisions in these cases provided another
assertion of the superiority of the federal government over the
states, one of his main themes.
There are two fundamental inter-related problems with the
papal documents from the thirteenth and the fourteen centuries
that the proponents of the Doctrine of Discovery rely on. In the first
place, they were produced in the context of the longstanding conflict
with the expanding Ottoman Empire, not with the European
expansion into the Americas. By focusing on the Americas and
applying language and concepts derived in the wars against the
Ottoman Turks in isolation from the larger context of relations
among nations within Europe and overseas, legal historians have
misunderstood and misused the texts that they cite. In order to
understand the documents, papal and royal, associated with
overseas expansion in those centuries, it is important to see them
against the background of the series of wars among the European
states from the late fifteenth century until 1763, wars that involved
European overseas possessions but in which they did not play a
major role. The wars among the leading states within Europe led to
the creation of the overseas empires, but this was not the original
goal. As John Robert Seeley pointed out about the English imperial
experience, we “seem, as it were, to have conquered and populated
283. Id.
284. Id. at 576-77.
285. In this, the European powers were emulating the papal goal in issuing
Inter Caetera, assigning a monopoly of access to specific regions to the Spanish
and the Portuguese in return for supporting missionary efforts in the assigned
regions. The goal was to reduce conflict between the two kingdoms.
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half the world in a fit of absence of mind.”286 It was after all, only
after 1763, the end of the Seven Years War in Europe, the French
and Indian War in North America, that the English government
began to take a serious interest in the North American colonies.
The documents that the proponents of the Doctrine of
Discovery present to demonstrate that the papacy authorized the
Christian seizure of the lands and persons of all non-Christians do
not provide such authorization. They belong to a series of papal
bulls designed to regulate relations between and among European
Christian states. From the papal perspective, the intra-European
conflicts were weakening the defense of Latin Christendom in the
face of Ottoman expansion into eastern Europe, eventually as far as
Prague and Vienna as late as 1683.287 The popes saw in the voyages
of exploration a means of uniting with the Christians of Asia in a
last great crusade against the Ottomans. The European monarchs
who initially authorized overseas voyages were not interested in
colonization, but in trade with Asia by sea routes that would evade
the Ottoman domination of the older land routes. Much of the silver
acquired in the Americas went for paying “for luxuries from India
and the East,” the original goal of the early explorers and for
financing Spanish political endeavors in Europe.288 Silver the
Spanish acquired in the Americas also went to support Habsburg
military efforts in eastern Europe where Ottoman expansion was a
direct threat to Habsburg lands.289
From the English perspective, beginning with Henry VII’s
charter to John Cabot, the goal of overseas voyages was trade with
Asia, not colonization. English merchants were much more
interested in finding a route to Asia through the Baltic and Russia
than in colonizing the Americas.290
Seen from Rome, Madrid, and London, the Americas were the
outer edge, the distant periphery, of Latin Christendom. The
overseas ventures were designed to enrich and support European
nations, the core of these empires.291
The principles articulated in the so-called Doctrine of
Discovery were not, for the most part, contained in medieval papal
documents. They were developed from the subsequent experience of
European states overseas, although the language in which they
were expressed sometimes came from the papal letters but
misunderstood or misapplied. The basic concepts dealing with
international law and relations were developed and applied in the

286. JOHN ROBERT SEELEY, THE EXPANSION OF ENGLAND 10 (1883).
287. TIM BLANNING, THE PURSUIT OF GLORY 543 (2008).
288. JOHN H. ELLIOT, SPAIN AND ITS WORLD (1990).
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numerous treaties among the warring European states within
Europe over the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. In effect, the
law was based on the customary practices of the European nations
involved and it was within that legal regime that John Marshall
operated. What the creators of these documents shared with the
papacy was a desire to regulate European international relations
home and abroad to bring a peaceful international order to
Christendom. In practice, however, to paraphrase a famous line
attributed to Andrew Jackson, neither the pope nor Grotius nor
John Marshall could enforce their conception of a just world
order.292

292. In response to Marshall’s holding in Worcester, Andrew Jackson
responded, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." Laura
Ellyn Smith, “Now Let Him Enforce It”: The Long History of the Imperial
Presidency, NAT’L COUNCIL ON PUBLIC HISTORY (Mar. 27 2017), ncph.org
/history-at-work/now-let-him-enforce-it-the-long-history-of-the-imperialpresidency/.

